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Abstract 
The processes of creative production and creativity recognition are both understood to be 
central to the dynamics of creativity. Nevertheless, they are generally seen by creativity 
researchers as theoretically unrelated. In contrast, social identity theorizing suggests a model 
of creativity in which groups play a role both in inspiring creative acts and in determining the 
reception they are given. More specifically, this approach argues that shared social identity 
(or lack of it) motivates individuals to rise to particular creative challenges and provides a 
basis for certain forms of creativity to be recognized (or disregarded).  This chapter 
explicates the logic underlying the social identity approach and summarizes some of the key 
evidence that supports it.   
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If one looks at an anthology of quotations, it is apparent that most people who reflect 
on the nature of creativity focus on the process through which creative ideas are generated.  
What leads a musician to write a great song, an author to pen a great book, or a scientist to 
make a great discovery? In fact, though, production is just one of three steps that are critical 
to the achievement of creativity.  Certainly it is the case that a person — or a group of people 
— has to come up with an idea (or an associated product) that is novel an innovative. But to 
have any purchase in the world, that idea also has to be recognized as valuable by others, and 
as well as being recognized as creative, it also has to have an impact on other people. A great 
song that no one recognizes as great and that no-one ever sings may be creative, but it is 
unlikely to be a song that is thought of and heralded as creative (e.g., inspiring people to ask 
what it was that led to it being written).  
In short, when people reflect on creativity, they have in mind a process than leads to 
products that are not only original but also useful and influential (Hennessey & Amabile, 
2010). Nevertheless, when researchers examine the creative process they often neglect these 
last two steps. Moreover, even if they do not, they tend to treat production and 
recognition/reproduction as theoretically unrelated aspects of the creativity process.  In 
contrast, in this chapter we outline a theory of creativity which sees each of these elements 
not only as central to the creative process but also as conceptually inter-related. More 
specifically, we suggest that the elements are linked by virtue of a social identity-based 
relationship that connects individual creators to groups that stimulate, appreciate, and 
respond constructively to their creativity. In these terms, the relationship between a creator 
and his or her (potential) in-group is seen to lie at the heart of the creative process as this has 
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an impact not only on the form of a person’s creative output but also on the response that that 
output receives.   
The Social Identity Approach to Creativity 
One basic premise of the social identity approach is that individuals can categorize 
themselves either as individual persons (‘I’, ‘me’) or as members of the groups to which they 
belong (‘we’, ‘us’; Turner, 1985). For example, an artist, Margaret, can categorize herself as 
an individual (i.e., ‘I, Margaret) or as a member of her artistic group (i.e., ‘us Australian 
modernists’ or ‘I, the Australian modernist, Margaret’). In the former case her sense of self is 
defined in terms of the idiosyncratic characteristics that define her sense of personal identity 
and it is these that determine her behaviour (Prentice, 2006; Turner, 1982). In relation to 
creativity, other things being equal, when a person’s personal identity is salient, it follows 
that their creations are more likely to reflect their own idiosyncratic style and that their 
evaluations of other creations are more likely to be guided by personal preferences. Under 
these circumstances, then, creative behaviour is likely to be informed by individual 
differences (e.g., Feist, 1998).  
In contrast, when social identity is salient, individuals derive relevant aspects of their 
sense of self from their membership of a particular group and value their own and others’ 
actions with reference to internalized understandings of that group membership (e.g., so that, 
as an Australian modernist, Margaret is interested in, and appreciates the value of Australian 
flora and geometric shapes). Put slightly differently, when a particular social identity 
becomes salient, individuals’ self-perception becomes depersonalized, such that their 
perceptions, evaluations, and actions are informed more by the shared attributes that define 
their social group membership and less by their unique individuating characteristics (Turner, 
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1982, 1991). One direct implication of this for creativity is that when social identity is 
salient, a person’s creative behaviour and their evaluation of the creative behaviour of others 
are likely to be informed by group values, preferences, and norms. For example, even though 
Margaret may strive for some degree of distinctiveness within the group of painters of which 
she is a part (Brewer, 1991; Codol, 1975; Jans, Postmes, & van der Zee, 2011a; Jetten & 
Postmes, 2006), when she thinks of herself as an Australian modernist, she will be more 
likely to paint and evaluate other paintings in ways that accord with artistic preferences that 
are shared within that group (e.g., preferring geometric representations of Australian flora to 
traditional representations of European subject matter).  
In line with previous contributions by Haslam, Adarves-Yorno, Postmes & Jans, 
2013, 2014), in what follows, we review some of the researcher that fleshes out this analysis 
by providing evidence of these identity-based processes at work. Because it is in many ways 
more obvious, we start by looking at the role of social identity in the recognition of creative 
products and then go on to examine at its role in creative production.  
The Recognition of Creativity  
Social identity theorizing (after Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher 
& Wetherell, 1987) points to a number of relational factors that are likely to be implicated in 
perceptions of creativity. In particular, these perceptions should be affected (a) by perceivers’ 
sense that they belong to a particular group (i.e., their self-categorization in terms of a salient 
social identity), (b) by the nature of a person’s relationship to that group (i.e., their social 
identification with it), and (c) by the norms, values and ideals associated with the salient 
social identity. These elements are all interrelated — in particular, because social 
identification is an aspect of self-category accessibility that determines social identity 
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salience (Haslam, 2004), but nevertheless it is helpful to consider the importance of each in 
turn.  
The role of shared social identity 
Self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987) argues that social identity and the 
recognition of shared (or non-shared) group membership are key determinants of people’s 
orientation towards others (Turner, 1991). In particular, when people consider themselves to 
belong to the same group (such that they self-categorize as members of a common ingroup) 
they will be more motivated to engage constructively with other ingroup members. Put 
slightly differently, shared social self-categorization creates an expectation among group 
members that, on group-relevant dimensions, their perceptions and behaviour will converge 
(Asch, 1951).  
The direct implication of this claim is that any given product is more likely to be 
perceived as creative and to be regarded favourably when its creator is seen to be a member 
of a psychological ingroup.  In other words, in order to dispel the uncertainty that creative 
products introduce by disrupting the status quo (Mueller, Melwani, & Goncalo, 2012), a 
creator needs to be seen as ‘one of us’ who is ‘doing it for us’ (Haslam et al., 2011; Turner, 
1991). Support for this idea is found in a range of settings (for experimental evidence, see 
Adarves-Yorno, 2005; Adarves-Yorno, Postmes, & Haslam, 2006; Adarves-Yorno, Haslam, 
& Postmes, 2008). For example, in organizational domains ‘insiders’ are often found to be 
antagonistic towards outsiders’ contributions — leading to what management theorists refer 
to as Not Invented Here (NIH) syndrome (Katz & Allen, 1982; Lichtenthaler & Holger, 2006; 
Stein, 2003).  
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Likewise, in artistic domains, people are typically found to display ethnocentric bias 
when judging others’ creativity (Simonton, 1984). That is, they consider ‘our’ creators and 
creations to be superior to ‘theirs’, and also regard creations (and dimensions of creativity) 
that valorise ‘us’ to be superior to those that valorise ‘them’ (Morton, Haslam, Postmes, & 
Ryan, 2006).  
Illustrative of this point, Steffens, Haslam, Ryan, and Millard (2017) report an 
extensive examination of the Oscars awarded by the US-based Academy of Motion Picture 
Arts and Sciences and the BAFTAs awarded by the British Academy of Film and Television 
Arts (since BAFTAs inception of the category ‘best actor/actress in a leading role’ in 1968). 
Both awards supposedly reflect the objective quality of films. It is clear however, that awards 
are not a reflection of quality alone, but also of national identity. In particular, US 
actors/actresses have received 67% of Oscar nominations but only 53% of BAFTA 
nominations. On the other hand, British actors/actresses have received 31% of BAFTA 
nominations but only 19% of Oscar nominations.  
Significantly too the tendency to valorise the efforts of national ingroup members is 
even more pronounced when it comes to the actual awarding of prizes (rather than just 
nominations): here US actors/actresses have received 78% of the Oscars but only 46% of the 
BAFTAs while British actors/actresses have received 42% of the BAFTAs but only 14% of 
the Oscars. More general evidence of this point also emerges from cross-cultural research 
which shows that what people actually mean by creativity (and hence how they measure and 
reward it) varies as a function of their cultural identity (e.g., Paletz & Peng, 2008; Raina, 
1993).   
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A commonly observed corollary of these observations is that ‘outsiders’ routinely 
experience difficulty in getting those who identify with other groups to acknowledge and 
engage with their creativity. In extreme cases, this differential responsiveness to ingroup and 
outgroup creativity can mean that people refuse to engage with the creative efforts of 
outgroup members altogether. This can involve dismissing others’ creative efforts as 
worthless or else vilifying them as sinful, obscene, and corrupt. Evidence of this is found in 
the Nazis’ denunciation of the Bauhaus movement (Amatrudo, 1997) and of what they 
referred to as “Degenerate Art” (e.g., Dada) which they contrasted with “Decent Art” (i.e., 
that which embodied National Socialist ideals; Doering, Pekarik, & Kindlon, 1997; Goggin, 
1991).  
It is apparent too that, far from being immune to identity forces of this form, similar 
dynamics are observed in science and academia (Kathoefer, & Leker, 2012).  Indeed, these 
are routinely encountered by researchers in the process of submitting their research for peer 
review (Mohoney, 1977). We can also vouch for the fact that this experience is no less 
uncommon when that research is on the topic of creativity. This observation goes to the heart 
of a paradox identified by Mueller and colleagues — namely that people commonly espouse 
the global virtue of creativity in the abstract but nevertheless end up rejecting many of the 
specific forms in which they encounter it in practice (Mueller, Melwani, & Goncalo, 2013; 
Rietzschel, Nijstad, & Stroebe, 2009).  
At the same time, the ingroup–outgroup boundaries that structure responses to 
creativity are not static and fixed but flexible and context-dependent (Doosje, Haslam, 
Spears, Oakes, & Koomen, 1998; Haslam & Turner, 1992). For example, the cinematic tastes 
of a young Australian woman may be dictated not only by her age, her nationality, her class, 
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her politics, or her gender, but also by the specific meaning of these (and other) ingroup 
categories in a given comparative and normative context. So, amongst other things, this may 
mean that she explicitly rejects films (and forms of creativity) that are supported by 
Hollywood studios and is instead a fan of independent or foreign cinema — because, in the 
context of going to the cinema, it is a particular political identity and not her nationality that 
provides the primary basis for her self-categorization. Apart from anything else, context-
dependent variation in self-categorization thus helps explain why creativity is sometimes 
embraced in unexpected quarters by those who seem to be outsiders. This point is 
exemplified by the success of the Detroit-based singer-songwriter Rodriguez (immortalized 
in the documentary film Searching for Sugarman; Bendjelloul, 2012) — whose emancipatory 
songs became influential in post-Apartheid South Africa at the same time that they were 
ignored in his American homeland.   
 To give a real example of how this can work in practice, we can reflect on an 
extreme case where White researchers from Europe sought to encourage Black prisoners in a 
maximum security prison in Africa to embrace Buddhist principles of mindfulness (Adarves-
Yorno & Mahdon, 2017. At first blush, one might consider this an impossible challenge, 
given the various dimensions of group difference at play here. However, in Naivasha, the 
largest Maximum security prison in Kenya, mindfulness principles and practices have not 
only have been accepted and incorporated into the prisoners’ lives but have also stimulated a 
wide variety of creative initiatives. How was this possible? As Adarves and Mahdon (2017) 
note, the key to success lay in identity leadership that served to craft a new sense of common 
identity in which the prisoners’ ingroup norms and values were redefined. More generally 
too, this process speaks to the fact that throughout history it is only though their skill as 
The social identity approach to creativity  10 
entrepreneurs of identity (Reicher, Haslam & Hopkins, 2005; see Haslam et al., 2011) that 
revolutionary leaders have been able to convince people to embrace the most extreme forms 
of creative challenge.          
The role of social identification 
A person’s social identity, though, is not all that structures their appreciation of 
creativity. In particular, it also matters how important that identity (and the group with which 
it is associated) is to them.  This argument flows from the observation that when a person 
identifies strongly with a given group, they will be more likely to interpret and engage with 
reality in a manner consistent with the values, norms, and ideology of that group (Turner, 
1991). For instance, if Margaret’s identification with the group of Australian modernist 
painters is strong, then (a) her paintings are more likely to conform to modernist ideals and 
(b) she is more likely to perceive other Australian modernist paintings to be creative than 
would be the case if she did not identify with this artistic group. Thus, identification with a 
group should lead a person (a) to converge upon views and actions that are characteristic of 
that group, (b) to be more committed to those views and actions, and (c) to be more open to 
influence from fellow ingroup members. All of these elements should in turn impact on 
perceptions of creativity and reactions to creative products. 
Consistent with this proposition, research has shown that identification is indeed 
related to responses to creativity. In particular, identification with a creator and involvement 
in the innovation process have both been found to influence people’s responses to 
organizational innovation (King, 2003). Furthermore, perceivers’ social identification with 
the group that perceivers and creators are part of has also been shown to impact on 
perceptions of creativity (Adarves-Yorno et al., 2006).  
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Such findings have practical implications for the implementation of changes and 
innovations that depend on people’s endorsement of creative ideas (Amabile, 1996). 
Specifically, it suggests that in an environment where people are uncommitted to, and lack 
identification with, the overall purposes of a group or organization (e.g., because they 
identify with a non-aligned sub-group), they will be less responsive to any innovation that the 
group or organization attempts to introduce (Mueller et al., 2012). This proposition is 
supported by a large body of organizational research which has explored people’s divergent 
responses to organizational change through the lens of social identity theorizing. The general 
finding here is that the less people identify with an organization, the less enthusiastic they are 
both with the process of change and with the leaders who devise and seek to implement it 
(e.g., see Ellemers, 2003; Haslam, Reicher & Platow, 2011; Jetten & Hutchison, 2010; Jetten, 
O’Brien, & Trindall, 2002; Terry, 2003).    
The role of in-group norms, values, and ideals 
The foregoing analysis treats the contexts in which creativity is assessed as if they 
were value-free — so that, a priori, no one course of action or style is seen as any more 
desirable than another. In the world at large, however, this is rarely the case. For in most 
situations, normative criteria define the forms of creativity that are considered acceptable (or 
not) and these in turn serve to structure people’s perceptions of creativity (Amabile, 1996; 
Haslam, Adarves-Yorno, & Postmes, 2014; Howe, 2000). This means that being recognized 
as creative is never just a matter of ‘being different’ but always of being different in 
particular ways. 
In approaching this issue, it is interestingly to note that researchers have previously 
observed that normative criteria can work in opposite ways. Accordingly, some researchers 
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argue that creations need to follow normative criteria in order to be considered creative 
(Markus & Kitayama, 1991), while others argue that creative products need to deviate from 
normative criteria (Amabile, 1996; Eiseman, 1990; Simonton, 2000). We have argued that 
self-categorization principles help us to reconcile these contradictory observations by 
suggesting that the impact of group concerns will vary as a function of social identity 
salience (e.g., Postmes & Spears, 1998; Reicher, 1987; Spears, Lea, & Lee, 1990; Wilder & 
Shapiro, 1984). In particular, self-categorization theory predicts that group concerns should 
only inform individuals’ judgments to the extent that the group in question (rather than a 
person’s individuality or another group) provides the salient basis for self-definition.  
One implication of this analysis is that when social identity is salient perceivers will 
tend to consider ideas and products to be more creative if they fall within the set of shared 
norms and ideals deemed acceptable by the ingroup (what Sherif & Hovland, 1961, referred 
to as the latitude of acceptance; see Haslam & Turner, 1992). On the other hand, when their 
personal identity (or an alternative social identity) is salient and particular social norms and 
ideals are explicit, people will tend to deviate from (or at least not act in line with) these and 
will therefore be more likely consider an idea to be creative if it too is non-aligned with them. 
These are propositions that Adarves-Yorno and colleagues (2006) examined in experiments 
that orthogonally manipulated both identity salience and group norms. The results of these 
showed that participants whose social identity was made salient perceived ideas to be 
creative when those ideas fell within the boundaries of group norms, but that participants 
whose personal identity was salient perceived ideas to be relatively more creative when they 
fell outside these boundaries.  
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This pattern supports claims that the recognition of creativity is essentially a social 
judgment (Csikszentmihalyi, 1998; Kasof, 1995) that is grounded not only in a person’s group 
membership (as noted above) but also in the specific criteria that are associated with, and define, 
that membership (Amabile, 1996). To be seen — and celebrated — as creative, creators therefore 
not only have to be seen as ‘one of us’, but their creations also have to be consonant with group 
members’ understanding of what creativity should look like. This is one reason why it can be 
helpful to acknowledge (as Newton did) that one’s creativity arises from “standing on the 
shoulders of giants” — because this signals clearly that your contribution extends upon the 
accomplishments of an ingroup with which you identify.  
The Production of Creativity  
The interactive role of self-categorization and group norms 
The foregoing review makes it clear that identity-related factors have a significant 
bearing on perceptions of creativity. Yet, important as this is, as we noted at the outset, it is 
apparent that researchers in this field generally more interested in actual creative behaviour 
and performance. In this regard, a key assertion of self-categorization theory is that social 
identity serves not only to regulate individuals’ perceptions but also their behaviour. It does 
this by providing the basis for them to have a shared perspective on social reality and to 
engage in mutual social influence (Turner, 1987, 1991; see also Haslam, 2004; Haslam & 
Ellemers, 2005; Postmes et al., 2005). This means that in a context where two or more people 
perceive themselves to share social identity, they will be motivated to co-ordinate their 
behaviour with reference to beliefs, values, and norms that define the group’s shared 
meaning (Haslam, 1997; Postmes et al., 2001; Postmes, Haslam, & Swaab, 2005; Postmes, 
Spears, & Lea, 2000).  
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For instance, a group of modernist painters is likely to develop particular artistic 
sensibilities and guidelines which then provide parameters for what is deemed creative (e.g., 
industrial rather than religious images; Crouch, 1999) and members of this artistic group are 
expected to paint with reference to those rules. In other words, to the extent that they see 
themselves as members of a distinct movement, individuals are likely to lay down and to 
follow group norms and ideals that define what it means to be ‘one of us’. These norms and 
ideals — which are internalized by group members and both describe and prescribe 
appropriate thought and behaviour within the group — then have an important social 
function as regulators of cognition and action (Bechtoldt, De Dreu, Nijstad, & Choi, 2010; 
Levine & Moreland, 1990; Nijstad & Stroebe, 2006; Turner et al., 1987).  
It is important to note that the impact of group norms in shaping expectations and 
encouraging conformity should depend, amongst other things, on how central the issues in 
question are for the group (Levine & Moreland, 1990; Postmes & Spears, 1998; Sherif, 
1936). The range of acceptable behaviours therefore depends of the centrality of the specific 
issues for the social identity in question (e.g., so that modernist painters are more likely to 
conform to modernist guidelines in their painting than in their dress). In this way, norms that 
relate to issues that are central to the group (e.g., painting) will tend to have a very narrow 
latitude of acceptance — such that the range of acceptable behaviours is quite restricted. On 
the other hand, norms that relate to peripheral aspects of group life (e.g., dress) will tend to 
have broader latitude of acceptance — so that there is a greater tolerance of deviance. 
Put slightly differently, when social identity becomes salient, people tend to conform 
to norms and ideals that define their ingroup identity (Reicher, 1987; Spears, Lea & Lee, 
1990; Wilder & Shapiro, 1984). Accordingly, a group member whose social identity is 
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salient is likely to behave creatively by conforming to norms and ideals. In contrast, someone 
whose behaviour is informed by personal identity is more likely to display creativity by 
deviating from the prevailing norm (Postmes, Spears, Sakhel, & de Groot, 2001). 
These propositions are supported by experimental studies which show that the nature 
of a person’s creative production depends both on the content of group norms and the degree 
to which those norms are self-defining (Adarves-Yorno et al., 2007). When their social 
identity is salient individuals thus engage in forms of creativity that involve following 
ingroup norms; but when their personal identity is salient their creativity involves departing 
from those norms. Importantly, this analysis helps explain why creativity can involve both 
acceptance and rejection of normative practices, and both divergent thinking (a.k.a., 
“thinking outside the box”; e.g., Mednick & Mednick, 1966; Thompson, 2003) and 
convergent thinking (“honing in” on a problem; Baer, 2003; Paletz & Schunn, 2010; Puccio 
& Cabra, 2009). Importantly too, it also provides a framework for understanding when it 
takes these different forms.  
A further contribution of social identity theorizing on these issues is to make it clear 
that group norms always have a role to play in shaping creativity, but that this role varies 
dramatically as a function of creators’ self-categorizations. When creators act in terms of a 
social identity that they share with others their creativity involves embracing group norms 
(and this can encourage either convergent or divergent thinking); but when they act as 
individuals (or in terms of a different social identity) their creativity centres on departure 
from those norms.  Thus even when their work is inspired by the need to distinguish 
themselves from a particular group, successful creators still need to understand the nature of 
the group from which they seek to deviate. For example, when the Sex Pistols sought to 
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break away from mainstream popular music in the 1970s, they were marshalled by calls to 
“undermine [the establishment’s] pompous authority, reject their moral standards, make 
anarchy and disorder your trademarks” (Oedy, 2014, p.16). Ironically, then, the musical 
establishment of the time gave punk musicians a particular creative force (the desire to 
rebel), as well as a specific trajectory (something specific to move away from) and appeal 
(for those disaffected with mainstream popular music). As with other successful creative 
efforts, attempts to break the mold were therefore not quite so random and anarchic as their 
progenitors would have their devotees believe.  
The role of social identification 
Up to this point in our review, we have largely ignored processes of group creativity, 
and indeed it is notable that until relatively recently, this was true of most creativity research. 
One key reason for this is that researchers have tended to find that the creative output of 
groups is less than the expected sum of their individual parts (e.g., Diehl & Stroebe, 1987; 
Sternberg & Lubart, 1996). As a result, most of the work on this topic is actually about group 
non-creativity.  Indeed, for many commentators, the very notion of ‘group creativity’ is 
something of an oxymoron (see Staw, 1999).  
On the basis of the analysis presented in the previous section, this observation is 
easier to understand once one recognizes that in much of this research, the groups in question 
are not particularly meaningful for their members (Hackman, 1998; Harkins & Szymanski, 
1989). To the extent that individuals fail to define themselves in terms of shared social 
identity, it therefore follows that they should be less likely to engage with a group’s creative 
tasks (e.g., as shown by Tang & Naumann, 2016). By the same token, as shared social 
identity increases, so should group members’ creative endeavour. And although group 
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identification stimulates normative conformity, it is a mistake to assume that this will only 
manifest itself in acts of slavish reproduction (Haslam & Reicher, 2012a). Indeed, where 
they perceive change and innovation to be advantageous for the group, high identifiers 
should be more likely to embrace them (Packer, 2008). 
In line with this point a number of studies support the proposition that individuals’ 
engagement in, and support for, group innovation depends upon their identification with the 
group in question and its goals (Haslam et al., 2006) and that when group members’ social 
identity is aligned with a demanding goal, this serves to stimulate their creativity, but when it 
is not, their creativity is stifled (Haslam, Wegge & Postmes, 2009). At the same time, 
though, as noted above, it is also apparent that this aspect of group creativity can be hard to 
recognize and appreciate because it is manifested in the form of convergent thinking and 
conformity. Nevertheless, although they are routinely denigrated, we have argued that these 
processes — which allow individuals to cohere around a shared mission — are essential for 
creative movements to progress (Haslam & Reicher, 2012b).  
The role of identity induction 
Our analysis up to this point has tended to imply that people generally have stable, 
social identities and a generally clear understanding of associated group norms and values. 
However, in many circumstances, the norms, values, and ideals associated with a given 
social identity are ambiguous and/or negotiable. Do British people value making rules or 
breaking them? Does my organization have a prevention or a promotion focus? Is Australia 
conservative or progressive? The fact that the answers to such questions is often “it 
depends”, means that even if individuals are highly identified and keen to buy into a group’s 
creative vision, they will not always know how to act.  
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This situation is likely to be quite common when groups are newly formed, when the 
group’s external context is highly changeable, and when a group experiences transitions in 
structure or leadership. Indeed, such ambiguity is one of the precursors to what Postmes and 
colleagues refer to as an inductive process of identity formation, wherein group members 
interact with one another with a view to developing consensus around new group norms and 
new understandings of shared social identity from the bottom up (rather than the top down; 
Postmes et al., 2000, 2005; see also Prentice, Miller, & Lightdale, 1994). 
This process of induction has two interesting implications for manifestations of 
creativity. The first is that identity induction can be seen as a form of creativity in its own 
right in so far as this provides group members with the opportunity to contribute to the 
evolution of social identity (Jans et al., 2011; Postmes, Spears, Lee, & Novak, 2005; see alo 
Haslam et al., 2011).. The second is that by incorporating individual contributions, identity 
induction encourages group members to be creative and develop independent perspectives on 
group-related matters. This has been confirmed by experimental research which shows that 
induction of shared social identity not only ‘locks in’ a diversity of viewpoints, but also 
promotes group creativity (Jans et al., 2012; Jans, Postmes, Van der Zee, & Seewald, 2013). 
In contrast to the idea that groups and social identification tend generally to stifle innovation 
(Baumeister, Ainsworth, & Vohs, 2016; Janis, 1972) it thus appears that induction of social 
identity can actually lead to the formation of groups that not only harness diversity but also 
promote pluralism and creativity (Haslam & Ellemers, 2016). 
The role of multiple social identities  
The previous section, outlined how the process of negotiating the meaning of social 
identity can itself promote creativity.  However, few (if any) people are members of just one 
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group. Instead, they belong to, and identity with, many groups, and accordingly have not one 
but multiple social identities. This raises the question of whether if one social identity can 
stimulate a certain amount of creative behaviour, multiple social identities might stimulate 
even more.  
This question has been a focus for research into multiculturalism which finds that 
people who have lived in two or more countries tend to be more creative than those who have 
only ever lived in one (Benet-Martinez, Lee, & Leu, 2006; Godart, Maddux, Shiplov, & 
Galinsky, 2015; Leung & Chiu, 2010; Leung, Maddux, Galinsky, & Chiu, 2008). However, it 
is apparent that people do not automatically become more creative once they move to a new 
country. Rather, this is brought about by a transformation in their sense of self. Speaking to 
this point, experimental and field studies by Tadmor, Galinsky and Maddux (2012) found 
that people who lived abroad (away from the country in which they grew up) showed greater 
creativity to the extent that they identified with the country they originated from as well as 
the country to which they emigrated. Not least, this is because when people identify with a 
relevant (cultural) group, any experience related to that group is more likely to facilitate 
(multicultural) learning in a form that tends to promote flexible and original thinking 
(Maddux, Adam, & Galinsky, 2010). It thus appears that people are more likely to reap 
creativity benefits from multiple group memberships to the extent they adopt an acculturation 
strategy of ‘integration’ that entails simultaneously staying connected to, and identifying 
with, both home and host cultures (Berry, 2005).  
In line with this point, a large body of evidence now points to the fact that social 
identification with two (or more) different cultural groups helps to promote creative thinking. 
More generally too, it appears that this is true not just of cultural groups, but of any groups 
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that a person is a member of in so far as these are characterised by a unique set of shared 
norms, beliefs, and values (e.g., whether it be a family, political, social, leisure, or 
geographic group). Speaking to this point, studies by Steffens, Cruwys, Goclowska, and 
Galinsky (2016) have shown that the more social identities a person has access to, the more 
ideas they generate on a creativity task (and the more original those ideas are). Importantly 
too, this research also rules out the possibility that such associations might be explained by 
personality (e.g., differences in extraversion or openness to experience; Feist, 1998). 
Speaking to questions of mechanism, the research also indicates that the link between 
multiple social identities and creativity link is accounted for more by an increase in flexible 
thinking (invoking different semantic categories) than by greater persistence (see also 
Nijstad, De Dreu, Rietzschel, & Baas, 2010). This suggests that multiple social identities are 
associated with creativity primarily because they allow people to access a different stock of 
knowledge and experience (i.e., to see the world through different lenses; for evidence 
concerning multiracial identities, see also Gaither, Remedios, Sanchez, & Sommers, 2015).  
The role of audience 
We noted at the start of this chapter that in previous research being creative and being 
seen to be creative have been treated as largely distinct processes (with the former studies 
rather more than the latter). Although own analysis has also tended to reproduce this 
dichotomy, it is nonetheless clear that these elements often have a strong bearing on each 
other. Not least, this is because the norms that shape creators’ productions will often shape 
the perceptions of those who judge their creative products (Postmes & Spears, 2002). Indeed, 
as we have seen, appraisals and acts of creativity have been shown to be structured by the 
same factors — namely, normative context and self-categorization (see Adarves-Yorno et al., 
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2006, 2007). Yet, in addition to being underpinned by the same processes, perceptions and 
behaviour should also be linked through their grounding in particular contexts — where 
creators have a clear sense of the group that is going to evaluate their work.  
Such contexts abound in everyday life for the simple reason that most creators expect 
(and want) their creations to be seen and evaluated by others (i.e., an audience of some form). 
In this, the audience corresponds to what proponents of the systems approach refer to as ‘the 
field’ and, as Csikszentmihalyi (1999) argues, this has the capacity to both stimulate and 
stifle creativity. From a social identity perspective one key reason for this is that the field can 
be seen to be comprised of others who either share or do not share identity with the creator. 
In line with the principles outlined in the previous two sections, these can then serve as a 
point of reference that creators either orient towards or deviate from.  
Findings which support these claims (e.g., see Haslam et al., 2012) again indicate that 
the nature of creativity is structured by norms to which creators are sensitive as they set about 
the task of being creative. Significantly, too, they suggest that in order to have positive 
impact, those norms have to be internalized as part of an ingroup identity (Turner, 1991). At 
one level, this observation is entirely unremarkable. It is hardly earth-shattering, for example, 
to observe that the work of contemporary musicians tends to be guided more by the tastes of 
21st century audiences than by those that prevailed during the Renaissance. Nevertheless, it is 
remarkable how little attention researchers have paid to the task of developing a coherent 
theoretical framework that might explain how social contexts (of which audiences are a key 
part) structure the equally important processes of creativity production and recognition. As 
we have argued elsewhere (Haslam et al., 2013), one of the most important contributions of a 
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social identity approach to creativity is to identify this as a major challenge for the field and 
to point to ways in which it might start to be addressed.    
Conclusion 
The social identity approach that we have outlined above suggests that rather than 
involving entirely different principles, there is a close theoretical relationship between the 
two essential components of the creative process: on one hand, acts of creativity (i.e., 
individual behaviour that is celebrated for its originality) and, on the other, the appreciation 
of creativity (i.e., judgments of individuals’ new ideas and products). The core argument here 
that it is processes of self and identity that connect these two components and that creative 
production and recognition arise from a dynamic interplay between social and personal 
identities and the norms which these either encapsulate or reject. .  
In practice, of course, these two aspects of the creative process need not be aligned. In 
particular, the groups that have a role in stimulating creative acts will not necessarily be the 
ones that ultimately evaluate those acts. Not least, this is because the broader contexts of 
these two processes will often be very different, and separated by both place and time.  
Indeed, in a more general sense, one of the significant features of the creativity process is that 
there is inevitably some uncertainly about who will ultimately evaluate creative productions 
— and this is one factor that makes the ultimate success of creative ventures unspecifiable 
and unknowable (Richards, 2001). In the case of Margaret Preston, for example, the group 
influences that shaped her painting were very different from those that ultimately contributed 
to her reputation because one consequence of her creativity was that it started out as a 
rejection of one set of particular artistic conventions but ultimately served to embed another 
set. Indeed, as this example illustrates, the creative process itself will often ensure a lack of 
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alignment between production and recognition phases both because it is a catalyst for social 
change and because it is ultimately celebrated for the social change that it produces (Jetten & 
Hornsey, 2011; Moscovici, 1976).  
This analysis integrates a number of significant observations that have previously 
been made by creativity researchers. In particular, it acknowledges the importance of social 
recognition (e.g., reputation; Galton 1869; Howe, 2000) to the creative process, and shows 
that the source of this lies in social consensus about the perceived value of creative acts 
(Amabile, 1983; Hennessey & Amabile, 1999). In line with systems and network approaches, 
it also suggests that in order to be recognized as creative, individuals need to have support 
(e.g., among potential critics) and be well-positioned within a relevant field (e.g., be aligned 
with relevant standards and norms and at the centre of a relevant social network; 
Csikszentmihalyi, 1999; Gronum, Verreynne, & Kastelle, 2012; John-Steiner, 2000).  It also 
recognizes that groups themselves can be both a stimulus and a site for creativity (Paulus, 
Brown, & Ortega, 1999) but whether this occurs depends both on the norms of the group 
(Paulus & Dzindolet, 1993) and its meaningfulness for would-be creators.  
The fact that the group norms which inform creativity differ dramatically (e.g., over 
time, across cultures) also explains why it is often hard to identify objective properties that 
define something as intrinsically creative (Amabile, 1996; Csikszentmihalyi, 1998) but why 
this task proves easier in domains where norms and associated social identities are 
consensually embraced and relatively stable (e.g., in mathematics as opposed to art). 
Nevertheless, even in hard science, we would argue that these same processes are at play. 
Here, though, their operation will often only be visible during times of profound upheaval 
(e.g., during scientific revolution; Kuhn, 1962).  
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As well as integrating these various observations, a particular strength of the social 
identity approach is that it provides novel answers to a number of thorny questions in the 
creativity literature — most obviously, Amabile’s (1996) concern about what makes creative 
acts different from ordinary ones and what it is that stimulates them. First, the approach 
argues that creative performance is always defined relative to the norms of ordinary 
performance from which it deviates. It suggests, however, that the valorisation of deviation 
depends on the identity-based relationship between creators and relevant audiences. More 
specifically, creativity should generally only be appreciated to the extent that it is (or comes 
to be) understood to be motivated by the advancement of particular group interests.  
One final observation that flows from this analysis is that it is the creation of new (or 
transformed) communities that lies at the heart of successful creativity (Adarves-Yorno et al., 
2008; Haslam et al., 2011). These provide the basis for collective appreciation of the creator 
and they also provide the means to drive forward the social change that creativity envisions 
and that makes it an essential engine of culture. In the absence of such community, Margaret 
Preston’s paintings attracted little interest. However, once they came to be seen as 
emblematic of nascent modernism and a new national identity, Australian art was never the 
same again.  
In these terms, what is really interesting about the creative process is not that it shows 
how great creators are set apart from society. Rather, it is that it shows the very opposite: that 
great creations are produced by societies whose transformation then provides a basis for the 
creator’s individuality to be celebrated. By this means, creativity comes to serve two 
essential inter-related functions upon which all social progress depends: changing the world 
and changing the way we see ourselves.          
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